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Abstract. In a recent paper Reny (2011) generalized the results of Athey
(2001) and McAdams (2003) on the existence of monotone strategy equilib-
rium in Bayesian games. Though the generalization is subtle, Reny introduces
far-reaching new techniques applying the fixed point theorem of Eilenberg and
Montgomery (1946, Theorem 5). This is done by showing that with atomless
type spaces the set of monotone functions is an absolute retract and when the
values of the best response correspondence are non-empty sub-semilattices of
monotone functions, they too are absolute retracts. In this paper we provide an
extensive generalization of Reny (2011), McAdams (2003), and Athey (2001).
We study the problem of existence of Bayesian equilibrium in pure strategies
for a given partially ordered compact subset of strategies. The ordering need
not be a semilattice and these strategies need not be monotone. The main
innovation is the interplay between the homotopy structures of the order com-
plexes that are the subject of the celebrated work of Quillen (1978), and the
hulling of partially ordered sets, an innovation that extends the properties of
Reny’s semilattices to the non-lattice setting. We then describe some auctions
that illustrate how this framework can be applied to generalize the existing
results and extend the class of models for which we can establish existence of
equilibrium. As with Reny (2011) our proof utilizes the fixed point theorem
in Eilenberg and Montgomery (1946).
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1. Introduction
This paper analyzes a class of games of incomplete information in which each
player has private information about her type, chooses an action, and receives a
payoff as function of the profiles of types and actions. There is a common prior
on the space of type profiles, so each agent’s beliefs after observing her type are
derived by conditioning. Players may be heterogeneous in their preferences and
type distributions. Moreover, players’ types may not be independent and their
payoff functions may depend directly on all players’ types. Auctions are perhaps
the most important games in such class, but our formulation is very general and
most other models of interest have this structure.
The goal of this paper is to generalize some of the assumptions required in the
existing literature on existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria. In particular, we
dispense with two such requirements:
(1) that players have a nondecreasing optimal strategy in response to nonde-
creasing strategies played by their opponents; and
(2) that different dimensions of a player’s own actions are complements.
In order to achieve that, we describe a new class of absolute retracts, that emcom-
passes but is more general than the contractible semilattices used in the literature.
Based on this new class of absolute retracts, we are then able to apply the fixed
point theorem of Eilenberg and Montgomery (1946) to extend the current results
on existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in new directions.
There is an extensive literature concerned with existence of equilibrium for such
games, with Milgrom and Weber (1985) being a groundbreaking contribution. Of-
ten one is interested in equilibria in which the agents’ strategies have some pre-
scribed structure. Whithin many economic frameworks, it is natural to look in par-
ticular for equilibria in which each agent follows a pure strategy that is an increasing
function of her type. Milgrom and Shannon (1994) were the first to develop a gen-
eral theory and method for this kind of analysis. Athey (2001), McAdams (2003),
and Reny (2011) provide increasingly general existence results of this sort. This
paper extends this line of research, providing a theory that encompasses Reny’s
results while generalizing the relevant methods in new directions. Recent devel-
opments, focusing on existence of equilibrium in auctions, include Mensch (2019),
Prokopovych and Yannelis (2018), and Woodward (2019).
To illustrate the scope of our results, we present three applications to auctions.
The first one is an all-pay auction model in which bidders have one-dimensional
type and action spaces, interdependent valuations, and correlated types in ways
that may fail the monotone likelihood ratio property. Thus, this all-pay auction
shows that, compared to Athey (2001), our main result extends the the analysis of
pure-strategy equilibria to models that fail the (weak) single-crossing property. The
second application is a first-price auction in which bidders’ types are multidimen-
sional and their valuations are interdependent, but restricted to be of polynomial
form. The second example thus shows how our main result extends the analysis of
McAdams (2003) and Reny (2011) when players have multidimensional type spaces.
In both applications, there is no order on the bidder’s types that allows for stan-
dard arguments to be used to show existence of monotone equilibrium. The third
application is a first-price auction of multiple objects that are substitutes from the
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bidders’ perspective. In this case, the bidders’ valuations fail to be (weakly) quasi-
supermodular, as required by McAdams (2003). Further, there is no order on the
bidders’ actions for which the best responses are closed with respect to the point-
wise supremum of the bids, thus the more general results of Reny (2011) cannot be
applied. It is possible, however, to use our main result to show that this auction
has an equilibrium in pure strategies.
The remainder of the paper has the following structure. The mathematical
framework, which concerns absolute retracts and ordered spaces, is described in
Section 2. In Section 3, we describe a new class of absolute retracts, which is the
machinery used to prove the main result in this paper. The class of Bayesian games
our result covers is described formally in Section 4, where the main existence result
is proved. Section 5 studies a number of models that illustrate how this framework
can be applied. Section 6 explains how the main results in Athey (2001), McAdams
(2003), and Reny (2011) can be derived as a consequence of our result.
2. Mathematical framework
In this section, we review the basic mathematical frameworks that are combined
to yield the results in this paper: absolute retracts, lattice theory, and abstract
simplicial complexes.
2.1. Absolute retracts. Fix a metric space X. If Y is a metric space, a set Z ⊆ Y
is a retract of Y if there is a continuous function r : Y → Z with r(z) = z for all
z ∈ Z. Such function r is called a retraction. The space X is an absolute retract1
(AR) or an absolute neighborhood retract (ANR) if, whenever X is homeomorphic
to a closed subset Z of a metric space Y , Z is a retract of Y or a retract of a
neighborhood of itself, respectively. Since the “is a retract of” relation is transitive,
a consequence is that a retract of an AR (ANR) is an AR (ANR). An ANR is an AR
if and only if it is contractible (Borsuk, 1967, Theorem 9.1). A contractible set is a
set that can be reduced to one of its points by a continuous deformation. Formally,
a set X is said to be contractible if it is homotopic to one of its points x ∈ X, that
is, if there is a continuous map h : [0, 1]×X → X such that h(0, · ) : X → X is the
identity map and h(1, · ) : X → X is the constant map sending each point to x. In
this case, the mapping h is denoted a contraction.
The Eilenberg-Montgomery fixed point theorem (Eilenberg and Montgomery,
1946) asserts that if X is a nonempty compact AR, F : X ↠ X is a closed-graph
correspondence, and the values of F are “acyclic,” then F has a fixed point. For
the purposes of this paper, it suffices to know that a contractible set is acyclic, so
that F has a fixed point if its values are contractible. Kinoshita (1953) gives an
example of a compact contractible subset of R3 and a continuous function from
this space to itself that does not have a fixed point, so the assumption that X is a
compact AR cannot be weakened to “compact and contractible.”
In Athey (2001) and McAdams (2003) a large part of the analytic effort is de-
voted to showing that the set of monotone best responses to a profile of monotone
strategies is convex valued. However, Reny (2011) provides a simple construction
that shows that this set is contractible valued. In addition, passing to the more
general Eilenberg-Montgomery fixed point theorem allows many of the assumptions
1The terms “metric absolute retract” and “absolute retract for metric spaces” are used in
mathematical literature that also considers spaces that satisfy the embedding condition for other
types of topological spaces.
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of earlier results to be relaxed. The weakening of hypotheses does not complicate
the proof of contractibility, but instead there is the challenge of showing that the
set of (equivalence classes of) monotone pure strategy profiles is an AR. Since the
set of monotone strategy profiles is contractible, Reny could demonstrate this by
verifying the sufficient conditions for a space to be an ANR given by Theorem 3.4
of Dugundji (1965), which is derived from necessary and sufficient conditions given
earlier in that paper that in turn build on Dugundji (1952) and Dugundji (1957).
A central theme of this paper is that there is a variety of conditions that imply
that a space is an AR. Any of these is potentially the basis of an equilibrium ex-
istence result for some type of Bayesian game, and we will provide novel existence
results of this sort. In particular, it will be possible to verify other sufficient condi-
tions for a space to be an AR that are related to the order structure of the space
of monotonic strategy profiles, and are thus in a sense more natural. Perhaps more
importantly, they are flexible, allowing for existence under different hypotheses. In
order to provide a context for these results, and to help guide the reader into the
relevant literature, Appendix B surveys necessary and sufficient conditions for a
space to be an ANR or an AR.
2.2. Simplicial complexes. An abstract simplicial complex is a pair ∆ = (X,X )
in which X is a set of vertices and X is a collection of finite subsets of X that
contains every subset of each of its elements. Elements of X are called simplices.
The realization of ∆ is
|∆| =
{
π ∈ RX+ :
∑
x∈X
πx = 1, and suppπ ∈ X
}
,
where suppπ = {x ∈ X : πx > 0}. For a simplex Y ∈ X , let |Y | = {π ∈
|∆| : suppπ ∈ Y }. Then |∆| =
∪
Y ∈X |Y |. We will always assume that {x} ∈ X
for every x ∈ X. We endow |∆| with the CW topology, which is the topology in
which each |Y | has its usual topology and a set is open whenever its intersection
with each |Y | is open.
Let Z be a topological space. A correspondence F : X \{∅} → Z is a contractible
carrier that sends simplices of ∆ to subsets of Z if, for every nonempty Y ∈ X :
(a) F (Y ) is contractible, and
(b) if ∅ ̸= Y ′ ⊆ Y , then F (Y ′) ⊆ F (Y ).
Moreover, a continuous function f : |∆| → Z is carried by F if f(|Y |) ⊆ F (Y ) for
every Y ∈ X . The following result is from Walker (1981).
Lemma 2.1 (Walker’s carrier lemma). If F is a contractible carrier from ∆ to Z,
then there is a continuous function f : |∆| → Z carried by F , and any two such
functions are homotopic.
For the remainder of the paper, we reserve the notation ∆ for the abstract
simplicial complex in which X is the collection of all finite subsets of X.
2.3. Posets and semilattices. A partially ordered set (poset) is a set X endowed
with a binary relation ≤ that is reflexive (x ≤ x for every x), transitive, and
antisymmetric (x ≤ y and y ≤ x implies x = y). Let
G≤ = { (x, y) ∈ X ×X : x ≤ y } .
If X is endowed with a σ-algebra Σ, the partial order ≤ is said to be measurable if
G≤ is an element of the product σ-algebra Σ⊗Σ. If X is endowed with a topology,
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the partial order ≤ is said to be closed if G≤ is closed in the product topology of
X × X. If X is a subset of a real vector space, the partial order ≤ is said to be
convex if G≤ is convex. Since { (x, x) : x ∈ X } ⊆ G≤, if ≤ is convex, then X is
necessarily convex.
A partially ordered set X is a semilattice2 if any two elements x, y ∈ X have
a least upper bound x ∨ y. If this is the case, then the semilattice operation
is obviously associative, commutative, and idempotent. That is, x ∨ x = x for all
x ∈ X. Conversely, if ∨ is a binary operation on X that is associative, commutative,
and idempotent, then there is a partial order on X given by x ≤ y if and only if
x∨y = y that makes X a semilattice for which ∨ is the least upper bound operator.3
A subset Y ⊆ X is a subsemilattice if x ∨ y ∈ Y for all x, y ∈ X. Evidently
the intersection of any collection of subsemilattices is a subsemilattice. A metric
semilattice is a semilattice endowed with a metric such that (x, y) 7→ x ∨ y is a
continuous function from X ×X to X. A metric semilattice is locally complete if,
for every x ∈ X and every neighborhood U of x, there is a neighborhood W such
that every nonempty W ′ ⊆W has a least upper bound that is contained in U .
2.4. The hyperspace of a compact metric semilattice. If X is a compact
metric space, the hyperspace of X is the set S(X) of nonempty closed subsets of X
endowed with the topology that has as a subbasis the set of sets of the form
N(U, V ) = {C ∈ S(X) : C ⊆ U and C ∩ V ̸= ∅ }
where U, V ⊆ X are open. The space X is locally connected if it has a base
of connected open sets. Wojdysławski (1939) showed that if X is connected and
locally connected, then S(X) is an AR. (Kelley (1942) reproves this result, and
places it in a broader context.)
Now suppose X is a compact metric semilattice. It is easy to show that any
subset S ⊆ X has a least upper bound that we denote by
∨
S. We say that X
has small subsemilattices if it has a neighborhood base of subsemilattices, which
is called an idempotent basis. It is easy to show that X is locally complete if and
only if it has small subsemilattices. Identifying each x ∈ X with {x} ∈ S(X),
we may regard X as a subset of S(X). McWaters (1969) showed that if X has
small subsemilattices, then the map C 7→
∨
C is continuous and consequently a
retraction. As McWaters points out, in conjunction with Wojdysławski’s result,
this result implies the following theorem.
Theorem 2.2. If X is connected, locally connected, and locally complete, then it
is an AR.
In the Bayesian game considered in Reny (2011), type and action spaces are as-
sumed to be semilattices, and strategy spaces are thus ordered by the induced point-
wise ordering. As a result, the subset of monotone strategies is a sub-semilattice,
therefore contractible to its least upper bound. In the following section, we extend
this result to more general partially ordered subsets of strategies, including subsets
that are not necessarily given the induced pointwise ordering or that may not have
a least upper bound.
2This concept is often described as a join semilattice in contexts in which one also considers
meet semilattices, which are posets in which any pair of elements has greatest lower bound.
3Verification of the details underlying this assertion is straightforward.
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3. A new class of retracts
This section describes a new class of absolute retracts, generated by combining
the order structure of posets and abstract simplicial complexes.
3.1. Hullings and monotone realizations. Let X be a metric space and a poset.
(We do not assume that the order is closed.) A (finite) chain in X is a (finite)
completely ordered subset of X. When X is a partially ordered space, we consider
the order complex Γ = (X,XΓ) of X. The order complex Γ is the abstract simplicial
complex for which the set of vertices is X itself and the collection of simplices XΓ
is the collection of finite chains of X. If Γ = (X,XΓ) is the order complex of X
and ∆ = (X,X ) is the abstract simplicial complex in which the simplices are all
finite subsets of X, then XΓ ⊆ X , and we regard the geometric realization |Γ| as a
subspace of |∆|. If Y is a finite subset of X, then Y ∈ X and we denote by |Y Γ|
the realization of Y on the order complex Γ, that is, |Y Γ| = |Y | ∩ |Γ|.
The following definition describes a novel mathematical concept.4 We say that a
sequence of subsets of X converges to x ∈ X if the sequence is eventually contained
in each neighborhood of x.
Definition 3.1. A hulling of X is a collection H of subsets of X such that:
(a) H is closed under intersection;
(b) every finite subset of X is contained in some element of H;
(c) for each nonempty Y ∈ H, the realization |Y Γ| is contractible.
When Y is a finite subset ofX, the H-hull of Y , denoted by H(Y ), is the intersection
of all Y ′ ∈ H containing Y . The hulling H is small if, for any sequence of finite
sets Yn converging to a point x, the sequence H(Yn) also converges to x.
Note that if X has an upper bound, then |Γ| is contractible.
Definition 3.2. A monotone realization is a continuous function h : |Γ| → X.
A monotone realization h is said to be local whenever, for every sequence Yn of
nonempty finite chains converging to x ∈ X, the sequence h(|Yn|) also converges to
x.
Together, the notions of hulling and monotone realization describe what we call
order-convexity.
Definition 3.3. A partially ordered set (X,≤) is order-convex if there is a small
hulling H and a local monotone realization h for X such that
(a) for every finite subset Y ⊆ X, we have H(Y ) ⊆ X; and
(b) for every finite chain Y in X, we have h(|H(Y )Γ|) ⊆ X.
The following lemma establishes that every order-convex, separable, metric space
is an absolute retract.
Lemma 3.4. If (X,≤) is partially ordered space that is separable, metric, closed,
and order-convex, then X is an absolute retract.
Proof. If X is separable, metric space, then it can be isometrically embedded as a
subset of a Banach space Y . It suffices to construct a retraction r : X → Y .
4It is a generalization of the notion of a zellij in McLennan, Monteiro, and Tourky (2011).
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For each y ∈ Y \X, let φ(y) = inf{∥y−x∥Y : x ∈ X}. Define the correspondence
F : Y \X ↠ X by
F (y) = {x ∈ X : ∥y − x∥Y < 2φ(y)} .
Because φ(y) > 0 for every y ∈ Y \X, it follows that F (y) is nonempty. Moreover,
F has open lower sections. Thus, if X∗ is a countable dense subset of X, then
{F−1(x) : x ∈ X∗} is a countable open cover of Y \ X. Let U be a locally finite
refinement, and let {πU : U ∈ U} be a partition of unity subordinated to it. For
each U ∈ U , there is at least one x ∈ X∗ such that U ⊆ F−1(x); let xU denote
such x. For every y ∈ Y \X, we identify the collection π(y) = {πU (y) : U ∋ y} with
the corresponding point in the simplex |{xU : U ∋ y}|. By Walker’s carrier lemma,
there exists a continuous function f : |∆| → |Γ|, such that for every finite subset
Y ′ ⊆ Y , f(|Y ′|) ⊆ |H(Y ′)Γ|. Define the function r : Y \X → X by
r(y) = h(f(π(y)) .
Extend the function r to X by setting r(x) = x for every x ∈ X.
Since r|Y \X and r|X are continuous by construction, it suffices to check that, for
every sequence (yn)n ⊆ Y \ X converging to some x ∈ X, the sequence (r(yn))n
converges to r(x) = x. But, for every n, if x′ ∈ suppπ(yn), then d(yn, x′) <
2φ(yn). As n goes to infinity, φ(yn) converges to zero. Because the hulling is small,
that implies that H(suppπ(yn)) converges to x. Further, because the monotone
realization is local, h(f(π(yn))) converges to x. □
3.2. Sufficient conditions on subsemilattices. We now investigate the rela-
tionship between these structures and metric semilattices, endowed with the join
subsemilattice hull.
Lemma 3.5. If X is a locally complete, metric semilattice and H is the family of
all finite subsemilattices, then H is a small hulling.
Proof. Let Yn be a sequence of finite sets converging to x ∈ X, and let U be a
neighborhood of x. Since X is locally complete, there is a neighborhood W of x
such that every nonempty Y ⊆ W has a least upper bound in U . Suppose that
Yn ⊆ W , as is the case for large n. Then { y1 ∨ · · · ∨ yk : y1, . . . , yk ∈ Yn } is
a subsemilattice that is contained in any subsemilattice that contains Yn, so it is
H(Yn), and each of its elements is contained in U . Thus H(Yn) ⊆ U for large n. □
The notion of a order-convexity is a straightforward generalization of the path-
connected metric-lattices extensively studied in Anderson (1959), McWaters (1969),
Lawson (1969), Lawson and Williams (1970), and Gierz et al. (1980). It arises quite
naturally. An order interval in X is a set defined by
[x, x′] = { y ∈ X : x ≤ y ≤ x′ } ,
for some x ≤ x′. We say that the order interval [x, x′] is monotonically contractible
if there is a contraction h : [0, 1]× [x, x′] → [x, x′] such that if α ≤ α′, then h(α, y) ≤
h(α′, y) for every y ∈ [x, x′]. The next lemma shows that every locally complete,
metric semilattice with monotonically contractible order intervals is order-convex.
Lemma 3.6. If X is a locally complete, metric semilattice with monotonically
contractible order intervals, then X is order-convex.
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Proof. Lemma 3.5 implies that the family H of all finite subsemilattices is a small
hulling. Notice that for any finite set Y the hull H(Y ) is the set {∨Z : Z ⊆ S, Z ̸=
∅}. We will use the following fact: any continuous function from the boundary of
a cell to a contractible space can be continuously extended accross the entire cell.
We will construct the monotone realization h by induction on the skeletons of Γ.
Recall that the n-skeleton Γ(n) is the subcomplex consisting of the simplices of Γ of
dimension n or less. For every vertex x in Γ(0), let h(x) = x. For each simplex Y in
Γ(1), choose a path ℓ : [0, 1] → [∧Y,∨Y ], and let h(π) = ℓ(π(∧Y )) for every π ∈ |Y |.
Notice that h(δ∧Y ) = ∧Y and h(δ∨Y ) = ∨Y . Therefore, h is well-defined and
continuous on |Γ(1)|. Further, h(|Y |) ⊆ [∧Y,∨Y ] for every 1-simplex Y in Γ(1). The
inductive hypothesis is that h : |Γ(n)| → X is continuous and h(|Y |) ⊆ [∧Y,∨Y ] for
every n-simplex Y in Γ(n). Now, suppose Z is an (n+1)-simplex. For every proper
face Y of Z, h(|Y |) ⊆ [∧Y,∨Y ] ⊆ [∧Z,∨Z]. Therefore, h(|BdZ|) ⊆ [∧Z,∨Z]. Since
Z is a cell and [∧Z,∨Z] is contractible, h can be continuously extended over |Z| in
such a way that h(|Z|) ⊆ [∧Z,∨Z]. Since the map h : |Γ| → X is continuous if and
only if it is continuous on each simplex, it follows that h is a monotone realization.
And since X is locally complete, the monotone realization h is local. □
4. Class of Bayesian games
We consider the class of Bayesian games described by the following tuple
G = ((T, T ), π, A, u) .
The space (T, T ) = ⊗i(Ti, Ti) is a product of N measurable spaces of types. The
probability measure π ∈ ∆(T ) is the common prior ; we let πi be the marginal
of π on Ti. The space (A,A) = ⊗i(Ai,Ai) is a product of N measurable spaces
of actions; we assume that each Ai is a compact subset of some Banach space
Li and is endowed with a σ-algebra Ai that includes the Borel sets. Finally, the
tuple u = (u1, . . . , uN ) is a profile of bounded jointly measurable payoff functions
ui : T ×A→ R.5
A (pure) strategy for player i is a function from Ti to Ai that is πi-a.e. equal to
a measurable function. Let Si be the set of player i’s strategies, and let S =
∏
i Si
be the set of strategy profiles. We regard the space of strategies Si as a subspace of
L1(Ti, πi), the space of Bochner-integrable functions (equivalence classes) from Ti






A strategy si ∈ Si is a best response to s−i ∈ S−i if Ui(si, s−i) ≥ Ui(s′i, s−i) for all
s′i ∈ Si. A strategy profile s ∈ S is an equilibrium if, for each i, si is a best response
to s−i.
Let Bi : S−i → Si denote the best response correspondence of player i:
Bi(s−i) = {si ∈ Si : si ∈ arg max
si∈Si
Ui(si, s−i)} .
5We use standard notation for the indexing of player profiles: for a N -tuple (Xi)Ni=1 of sets
we let X =
∏
i Xi, and for each player i we let X−i =
∏
j ̸=i Xj . Vectors in X are called profiles.
A profile x ∈ X is also written as (xi, x−i) where xi is the i-th coordinate of x and x−i is the
projection of x into X−i. We also use standard notation for probability: if (X,Σ) is a measurable
space, then ∆(X) is the set of probability measures on X.
BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM WITHOUT COMPLEMENTARITIES 9
Let B : S → S be the cartesian product of the Bi: B(s) = B1(s−1)×· · ·×BN (s−N ).
We make the following assumption on the common prior.
Assumption A.1. For every player i, the common prior π is absolutely continuous
with respect to the product of its marginals.
We also make the following assumption on the players’ payoffs.
Assumption A.2. For every player i, the function ui : T × A → R is continuous
in a and measurable in t.
Under Assumptions A.1 and A.2, the best response correspondence B is non-
empty and has closed graph (by Aliprantis and Border, 2006, Theorem 18.19). We
are ready to state our main result.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that Assumptions A.1–A.2 are satisfied. If, for every
player i, there is a compact, order-convex subset of strategies Ki ⊆ Si such that
Bi(s−i) ∩Ki is a nonempty, order-convex set for every s−i ∈ K−i, then the game
G has an equilibrium in K.
Proof. By Lemma 3.4, every compact, order-convex subset of strategies is an abso-
lute retract. Consider the subcorrespondence of best responses B : K ↠ K, given
by
B(s) = B(s) ∩K .
As defined, B has closed-graph, and compact, order-convex values. Therefore, it
satisfies the hypotheses of Eilenberg-Montgomery fixed point theorem. Hence it
has a fixed point in K, which is a Bayesian equilibrium of the game G. □
Remark 4.2. Theorem 4.1 not only helps proving existence of equilibrium results,
but it also provides additional, useful information regarding how the equilibrium
found looks like. In fact, this is the main motivation for the analysis in Athey
(2001), McAdams (2003), and Reny (2011).
Notice that this result does not require the players’ type and action spaces to
be partially ordered. Nor it requires the partial order on Ki to be induced by the
pointwise order. In fact, it allows for partial orders that may depend on the whole
strategy, as a function from types to actions. Further, Theorem 4.1 does not require
the marginals of the probability measure π to be atomless. It is, however, easier to
get order-convex best responses when the priors are atomless, as all three auctions
analyzed in Section 5 show.
5. Applications
We present three applications of the main result to auctions. Most of the auc-
tion literature relies on existence of monotone equilibrium—we refer to Kaplan
and Zamir (2015), Klemperer (1999), and de Castro and Karney (2012) for excel-
lent surveys. Although it is not difficult to write examples of auctions in which
monotonicity fails, as the examples in Jackson (2009), Reny and Zamir (2004), and
McAdams (2007) show, it remains unclear whether or not non-monotonicities in the
best-response correspondence pose a serious threat to the existence of equilibrium.
The auctions in this section shed some light on this issue.
The following auctions illustrate different directions in which Theorem 4.1 ex-
tends the benchmark results of Athey (2001), McAdams (2003), and Reny (2011).
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The first one concerns an all-pay auction that encompasses and generalizes some
standard existence results for such settings, including Athey (2001). The main ad-
vance here is in allowing for interdependent valuations and information structures
that may fail the monotone likelihood ratio property, yielding equilibria that are
not necessarily monotone in players’ types. This all-pay auction shows that, even
when restricted to the class of auctions with unidimensional types and actions,
Theorem 4.1 extends the analysis of pure-strategy equilibria to a broader range
of models. The second application involves a first-price auction in which bidders’
types are multidimensional and bidders’ valuations can be arbitrarily interdepen-
dent. The purpose of the second application is to highlight that, whithin the class
of auctions with multidimensional types, Theorem 4.1 allows for an analysis of a
much richer class of bidders’ preferences. The second example, thus generalizes the
existence results in McAdams (2003) and Reny (2011). In both applications, there
is no order on the bidder’s types that allows for standard arguments to be used to
show existence of monotone equilibrium. The third application is a first-price auc-
tion of multiple objects that are substitutes. With substitute objects, the bidders’
valuations fail to be quasi-supermodular, as required by McAdams (2003). More
importantly, there is no order on the bidders’ actions for which the best responses
are closed with respect to the pointwise supremum of the bids, thus the more gen-
eral results of Reny (2011) cannot be applied. It is possible, however, to use our
main result to show that this auction has an equilibrium in pure strategies. In
all three cases, it was not known whether a pure-strategy equilibrium exists. The
proofs of all claims made in this section are in Appendix A.
Before describing the auctions, a remark with regards to a modelling choice is
in order. In all three models, bidders submit bids at predetermined discrete levels,
that is, there exists a minimal increment by which the bid may be raised. Although
the auction literature deals almost entirely with continuous bids, in practice bidders
are not able to choose their bid from a continuum. At best, the smallest currency
unit imposes such restriction on feasible bids; at worst, the auctioneer may restrict
the set of acceptable bids even further. We thus consider this a natural assumption.
And even though it is possible to extend the analysis in this section to continuum
bids under additional assumptions, we choose to keep the more parsimonious and
realistic model with discrete bids.
5.1. All-pay auction. Consider an all-pay auction with incomplete information.
After observing the realization of their signals, bidders submit their bids, and pay
their bids regardless of whether or not they win the object. This kind of model
has been used to investigate rent-seeking and lobbying activities, competitions for a
monopoly position, competitions for multiple prizes, political contests, promotions
in labor markets, trade wars, and R&D races with irreversible investments.
There is a single object for sale and I bidders. Each bidder i observes the
realization of a private signal ti ∈ [t, t] = Ti. Signals of all bidders T = (T1, . . . , TI)
are drawn from some joint distribution with density f : [t, t]I → R+. The value
of the object being auctioned to bidder i is given by the measurable mapping
vi : [t, t]
I → R. We make the following assumption on the primitives of the model,
which is a generalization of the weak monotonicity condition of Siegel (2014).
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Assumption B.1. For each bidder i, there is a finite partition of the set of signals
Ti = ∪nIni into subintervals Ini such that for every t−i the restriction of the weighted
valuation vi(ti, t−i)f(t−i | ti) to each subinterval Ini is monotone6 in ti.
Remark 5.1. Essentially, Assumption B.1 puts an upper bound on the number of
times bidder i’s weighted valuation changes direction, it allows for very general in-
terdependence and correlation structures. In particular, it allows for the weighted
valuations to be nondecreasing on some subintervals and nonincreasing on others,
and does not impose any restrictions accross the subintervals {Ini }n. The indepen-
dent private value auction corresponds to the special case in which vi(ti, t−i) = ti
and f(t−i | ti) does not depend on ti.
Most of the literature on all-pay auctions concentrates on the case in which the
players’ weighted valuation functions are nondecreasing, yielding monotone equi-
libria. Assumption B.1 is a natural generalization of that single-crossing condition.
Given signal ti, bidder i places a bid b, chosen from a finite set of bids B ⊆ R.
The allocation of prizes is determined by the profile of bids. In particular, we
assume that there is a function α : {1, . . . , I} × BI → [0, 1], such that α(b) is a
probability measure over bidders. The interpretation is that αi(b) is the probability
that bidder i gets the object, given profile of bids b. We only assume that the
allocation mapping bi 7→ αi(b) is nondecreasing, that is, a higher bid will increase
the probability that bidder i gets the object.
A strategy for bidder i is a measurable function βi : Ti → B. Given a profile of
strategies of other bidders β−i, bidder i’s interim payoff is given by
Vi(b | ti, β−i) =
∫
[t,t]I−1
αi(b, β−i(t−i))vi(t)f(t−i | ti) dt−i − b .





Vi(βi(ti) | ti, β−i)f(ti) dti .
Theorem 4.1 implies that this auction has a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in which
each bidder i uses a strategy that is monotone in ti when restricted to each subin-
terval In.
5.2. First-price auction with interdependent values. Consider a sealed-bid
first-price auction in which bidders’ types are multidimensional and possibly inter-
dependent. This kind of model has been used to study, for example, procurement
auctions, in which bidders are suppliers who try to underbid each other to sell an
object or provide a service to a potential buyer. Government contracts are usually
awarded by procurement auctions, and firms often use this auction format when
buying inputs or subcontracting work.
There is a single object for sale and N bidders. Each bidder i’s type is a vec-
tor ti = (ti1, . . . , tiK) ∈ [t, t]K . Bidders’ types are independently drawn. Let
fi : [t, t]
K → R+ denote the density distribution of bidder i’s types. The value of
the object being auctioned to bidder i is given by the measurable map vi : [t, t]KN →
R+.
6By monotone, we mean either nonincreasing or nondecreasing.
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We assume that the map vi is the sum of polynomial functions in each bidders’








j1 · · · t
dmK
jK ,
where Mj is a finite index set for each j = 1, . . . , N and, for each m ∈ Mj , the
number αm is the coefficient of the m-th term and dmk are nonnegative integers.
The interpretation is that each dimension k of bidder i’s type represents an
inherent characteristic of the object, and bidders observe a noisy and independent
informative signal regarding these characteristics. Each of these characteristics may
or may not be intrinsically desirable. Thus, while we do not rule out symmetric
bidders, we do allow for heterogeneous preferences in the sense that different bidders
feel differently about each characteristic. In particular, for each dimension k, it may
be the case that some bidders prefer higher levels of k, whereas other bidders may
prefer lower or even intermediate levels.
Bidder i observes the realization of his private type ti, that gives information
about the characteristics of the object. Upon observing ti, bidder i submits a bid
bi from a finite set of bids B ⊆ R. Given a vector b = (b1, . . . , bN ) of bids of all
bidders, the object is awarded to the highest bidder, who pays his bid. If there is
a tie at the highest bid, then the object is awarded to one of the highest bidders
with equal probability. Let ρi(b) ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that bidder i gets
the object given profile of bids b. Given a vector b of bids, bidder i’s payoff is given
by
ui(b; t) = ρi(b)[vi(t)− bi] .
In this context, a strategy for bidder i is a measurable function βi : [t, t]K → B.




ui(β(t); t)f1(t1) . . . fN (tN ) d t .
Theorem 4.1 implies that this auction has a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in which
each bidder i uses a strategy that is (locally) nondecreasing in tik whenever ∂vi∂tik (t) ≥
0, and (locally) nonincreasing whenever ∂vi∂tik (t) ≤ 0.
5.3. First-price auction of multiple objects. Consider the following first-price
auction of multiple objects, in which bidders’ valuation of one object depends on
the other objects they may win. There are two objects for sale, object A and object
B, and N bidders. Each bidder i receives a private signal ti = (tAi , tBi ) ∈ [0, 1]2.
Bidder i’s signals are distributed independently of other bidders’ signals, according
to the density function fi : [0, 1]2 → R+. After observing their signals, each bidder i
submits a sealed bid bi = (bAi , bBi ) from a finite set of bids B ⊆ R2+. We assume
that the set of bids B contains the zero vector, that is, (0, 0) ∈ B.
If the realization of signals is t = (t1, . . . , tN ) and bidder i wins subset S ⊆ {A,B}
of objects, then bidder i’s payoff is given by
vi(S, ti) = max
k∈S
tki ,
with the convention that if S = ∅, then maxk∈S tki = 0. Under this formulation,
winning both objects gives the bidders no higher payoff than winning only the object
they consider most valuable. Therefore the objects may be seen as substitutes,
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which implies that vi fails any of the usual supermodularity conditions required by
previous existence results. In particular, best responses are not join-closed. Further,
there is no order on actions that will make the best responses either join-closed or
meet-closed, which means that it is not possible to show existence of equilibrium
using the result of Reny (2011).
Given a vector b = (b1, . . . , bN ) of bids of all bidders, each object k is awarded to
the bidder with the highest bid bki , who pays his bid. If there is a tie at the highest
bid, then the object is awarded to one of the highest bidders with equal probability.
Let ρi(S, b) ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability that bidder i gets the subset S ⊆ {A,B}













A strategy for bidder i is a measurable function βi : [0, 1]2 → B. Given a profile




Vi(β(t); ti)f1(t1) . . . fN (tN ) d t .
An application of Theorem 4.1 yields that this auction has a Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium in pure strategies. The equilibrium strategies (β1, β2) have the following
property: for every pair of types ti, t′i ∈ Ti, with i = 1, 2, if tAi ≥ t′iA and tBi ≤ t′iB ,
then βi(ti)A ≥ βi(t′i)A and βi(ti)B ≤ βi(t′i)B . That is, player i’s equilibrium bid for
object A increases (and his bid for object B decreases) as tAi increases (decreases)
and tBi decreases. In this model, bid shading happens for two reasons. First, bid
shading happens for the usual reason in first-price auctions, due to the trade-off
between a lower chance of winning versus a higher payoff when winning. Second,
players shade their bids also to reduce the probability of winning (and paying) for
both objects, when the second object gives them zero marginal value.
6. Literature
In this section, we show how the main result in Reny (2011), which general-
izes Athey (2001) and McAdams (2003), can be derived from Theorem 4.1. As a
reminder, we state Reny’s main result in a concise form.
Theorem 6.1 (Theorem 4.1 of Reny (2011)). Suppose that the following assump-
tions hold.
(1) For each player i,
(a) πi is atomless;
(b) Ti is endowed with a measurable partial order for which there is a
countable set T 0i ⊆ Ti such that for every E ∈ Ti with πi(E) > 0 there
are ti, t′i ∈ E with [ti, t′i] ∩ T 0i ̸= ∅;
(c) Ai is compact metric space, and a semilattice with closed partial order;
(d) either:
(i) Ai is a convex subset of a locally convex topological vector space
and the partial order on Ai is convex, or
(ii) Ai is a locally complete metric semilattice;
(e) ui(t, · ) is continuous for every t ∈ T .
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(2) Each player’s set of nondecreasing pure best replies is nonempty and join-
closed whenever the other players use nondecreasing pure strategies.
Then the Bayesian game G has an equilibrium in nondecreasing pure strategies.
First, we show that, under the assumptions listed, the set of nondecreasing
strategies is order-convex. Fix a player i. Being a compact, metric space, the
set of actions Ai can be isometrically embedded in a Banach space Li. The set
of nondecreasing strategies Mi for player i is thus a subset of Bochner-integrable
functions from Ti to Li, under the L1-norm topology. Partially order Mi according
to the (almost everywhere) pointwise order, as follows
fi ≥ gi ⇐⇒ fi(ti) ≥ gi(ti) πi − a.e .
Under this partial order, the set of nondecreasing strategies Mi is a metric semi-
lattice. Further, by Reny (2011, Lemmas A.10 and A.11), the set Mi is L1-norm
compact. The next lemma establishes that Mi is also locally complete.
Lemma 6.2. Under the assumptions of Theorem 6.1–(1), the set of nondecreasing
strategies Mi for every player i is locally complete.
Proof. Case (1.d.i): We show that, under assumption (1.c), if Ai is a convex subset
of a locally convex topological vector space with a convex partial order, then Ai is
a locally complete metric semilattice. Thus case (1.d.i) reduces to (1.d.ii). Given
Reny (2011, Lemma A.18), it suffices to show that if an is a sequence of actions
converging to a, then bm = ∨n≥man also converges to a as m goes to infinity.
Suppose bm does not converge to a. Because Ai is compact, taking a subsequence
if necessary, we may assume that bm converges to b ̸= a. Since am ≤ bm for every
m and ≤ is a closed order, it follows that a ≤ b. And since a ̸= b, it follows that
a < b. Because Ai is a convex subset of a metric, locally convex topological vector
space, with a closed order, there exist two disjoint, convex neighborhoods U of a
and V of b such that a′ < b′ for every a ∈ U and b ∈ V . Pick α ∈ (0, 1) such that
αa+ (1− α)b ∈ V . Since ≤ is closed, it follows that αa+ (1− α)b < b, and notice
that there is a convex neigborhood W of b such that αa + (1 − α)b < b′ for every
b′ ∈ W . Let M be an integer such that an ∈ U for every n ≥ M and bm ∈ W for
every m ≥M . Therefore, αa+ (1− α)b is an upper bound on the set
∪
n≥M{an}.
However, αa+ (1− α)b < bM , which contradicts bM = ∨n≥Man.
Case (1.d.ii): Given Reny (2011, Lemma A.18), it suffices to show that if fn
is a sequence of nondecreasing strategies converging in the L1-norm to f , then
∨n≥mfn also converges to f as m goes to infinity. So let fn be such sequence. From
Reny (2011, Lemma A.12), it follows that fn converges πi-almost everywhere to
f . Given that Ai is locally complete and using Reny (2011, Lemma A.18) again,
it follows that ∨n≥mfn(ti) converges to f(ti) for πi-almost every ti as m goes to
infinity, which implies L1-norm convergence. □
Given Lemmas 3.6 and 3.5, if the set of nondecreasing strategies Mi has mono-
tonically contractible order intervals, then it is order-convex.
Lemma 6.3. Under the assumptions of Theorem 6.1–(1), the set of nondecreasing
strategies Mi for every player i is order-convex.
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Proof. From Reny (2011, Lemmas A.3 and A.15), it follows that if [fi, f ′i ] is an
order interval in Mi, then h : [0, 1]× [fi, f ′i ] → [fi, f ′i ] given by
h(α, gi) =
{
gi(ti) if Φi(ti) ≤ α ;
f ′i(ti) otherwise .
is a monotone contraction. Thus, Mi is order-convex. □
Notice that each player i’s best reply is join-closed, by assumption, and closed
with respect to the monotone contraction, by construction. Thus, given Lemmas 6.2
and 6.3, the existence of an equilibrium in nondecreasing pure strategies follows
from Theorem 4.1.
Appendix A. Proofs for Section 5
In all three auctions described in this section, the bidders’ type and action spaces
are subsets of Euclidean spaces. When required, we equip these spaces with the
Lebesgue σ-algebra and the Lebesgue measure λ. In particular, this means that
density functions on types are absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue
measure. Moreover, under these assumptions, the partial order on strategies in-
duced either by the poitwise supremum or the pointwise infimum is measurable.
A.1. All-pay auction. We first describe the bidder-specific set of strategies Ki.
We then show that, using the sufficient conditions from Lemmas 3.6 and 3.5, it
satisfies the requirements of Theorem 4.1.
Fix a bidder i. To describe the set Ki, let N+i denote the set of indexes k such
that the weighted valuation vi(ti, t−i)f(t−i | ti) is nondecreasing on the interval
Ini , that is, define
N+i = {n : vi(ti, t−i)f(t−i | ti) is nondecreasing over I
n
i } .
Notice that, given Assumption B.1, N+i consists of a finite collection of indexes.
Likewise, define N−i to be the set of indexes k such that the weighted valuation
vi(ti, t−i)f(t−i | ti) is nonincreasing on the interval Ini , that is,
N−i = {n : vi(ti, t−i)f(t−i | ti) is nonincreasing over I
n
i } .
We may take N+i and N
−
i to be disjoint. We define Ki to be the set of measurable
functions from Ti = [t, t] to B that are nondecreasing over Ini when n ∈ N
+
i and
nonincreasing over Ini when n ∈ N
−
i . Formally, define
Ki = {f : f |Ini is nondecreasing for every n ∈ N
+
i




As defined, Ki is a closed subset of functions of bounded variation, with a uniform
total variation bound of | ∨ B − ∧B| × (|N+i | + |N
−
i |). Thus, by Helly’s selection
theorem, it is a L1-norm compact subset of measurable functions. The following
lemmas show that Ki satisfies the conditions required to apply Theorem 4.1.
Lemma A.1. The subset of strategies Ki is a locally complete, metric semilattice.
Proof. The set Ki, endowed with the L1-norm, is clearly a metric semilattice. It
only remains to show that it is locally complete. Given Reny (2011, Lemma A.18),
it suffices to show that if gk is a sequence of strategies in Ki converging in the
L1-norm to f , then ∨k≥mgk also converges to g as m goes to infinity. Let gk be
BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM WITHOUT COMPLEMENTARITIES 16
such sequence. Fix n ∈ N+i and consider the function given by gk1Ini , where 1E is
the indicator function of E ⊆ Ti. Because gk is nondecreasing on Ini , from Reny
(2011, Lemma A.12), it follows that gk1Ini converges almost everywhere to g1Ini .
Applying the same argument to −gk1Ini for n ∈ N
−
i yields that gk1Ini converges




i . Since there is a finite number
of subintervals, it follows that gk =
∑
n gk1Ini converges almost everywhere to
g =
∑
n g1Ini . Given the real numbers are locally complete, applying Reny (2011,
Lemma A.18) again, it follows that ∨k≥mgk(ti) converges to g(ti) for almost every
ti as m goes to infinity. Therefore, ∨k≥mgk converges to g in the L1-norm. □
In view of Lemma 3.5, we record the following corollary of this result.
Corollary A.2. The family H of all finite subsemilattices of Ki is a small hulling.
The next lemma shows that the order intervals of Ki are monotonically con-
tractible.
Lemma A.3. The subset of strategies Ki has monotonically contractible order
intervals.






g′′i (ti) if ti ∈ Ini with k ∈ N
+
i and | ∨ Ini − ti| ≤ α| ∨ Ini − ∧Ini | ,
g′′i (ti) if ti ∈ Ini with k ∈ N
−
i and |ti − ∧Ini | ≤ α| ∨ Ini − ∧Ini | ,
gi(ti) otherwise .
The function h is the required monotone contraction. □
As a result of Lemma 3.5, we have the following corollary of this result.
Corollary A.4. The subset of strategies Ki is order-convex.
The next two lemmas check that the best response correspondence also satisfies
the conditions of the theorem.
Lemma A.5. The intersection of the best response correspondence Bi(β−i) with
Ki is nonempty for every strategy profile of other bidders β−i.
Proof. Fix a profile of strategies for other players β−i. We show that the interim
best response correspondence
Bi(β−i | ti) = argmax
b∈B
Vi(b | ti, β−i)
has a selection in Ki. Consider the selection gi(ti) = ∨Bi(β−i | ti). It is well-defined
because B is finite. Moreover, it is measurable because the pointwise partial order
is measurable. The proof now procedes by contradiction to show that gi is in Ki.
Suppose gi /∈ Ki. Then there exist t′i > ti, both in some subinterval Ini , such that
either (i) gi(ti) > gi(t′i) and n ∈ N
+
i , or (ii) gi(t′i) > gi(ti) and n ∈ N
−
i .
Consider case (i). Because gi is defined as the maximum interim best response,
it follows that gi(ti) /∈ Bi(β−i | t′i). Thus
(2) Vi(gi(t′i) | t′i, β−i)− Vi(gi(ti) | t′i, β−i) > 0 .
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Furthermore,




[αi(gi(ti), β−i(t−i))− αi(gi(t′i), β−i(t−i))]vi(t′i, t−i)f(t−i | t′i) dt−i
− gi(ti) + gi(t′i) .
Since the allocation mapping αi is positive and nondecreasing in its first argument
and vifi is positive and nondecreasing in bidder i’s signal, it follows that∫
[t,t]I−1
[αi(gi(ti), β−i(t−i))− αi(gi(t′i), β−i(t−i))]vi(t′i, t−i)f(t−i | t′i) dt−i ≥∫
[t,t]I−1
[αi(gi(ti), β−i(t−i))− αi(gi(t′i), β−i(t−i))]vi(t)f(t−i | ti) dt−i ,
and hence
Vi(gi(ti) | t′i, β−i)− Vi(gi(t′i) | t′i, β−i) ≥ Vi(gi(ti) | ti, β−i)− Vi(gi(t′i) | ti, β−i) ,
However, optimality also implies that
Vi(gi(ti) | ti, β−i)− Vi(gi(t′i) | ti, β−i) ≥ 0 .
and hence
Vi(gi(ti) | t′i, β−i)− Vi(gi(t′i) | t′i, β−i) ≥ 0 ,
which contradicts equation 2.
Consider now case (ii). Because gi is defined as the maximum interim best
response, it follows that










i), β−i(t−i))− αi(gi(ti), β−i(t−i))]vi(t)f(t−i | ti) dt−i
− gi(t′i) + gi(ti) .
Since the allocation mapping αi is positive and nondecreasing in its first argument












i) | ti, β−i)− Vi(gi(ti) | ti, β−i) ≥ Vi(gi(t′i) | t′i, β−i)− Vi(gi(ti) | t′i, β−i) ,
However, optimality also implies that
Vi(gi(t
′




i) | ti, β−i)− Vi(gi(ti) | ti, β−i) ≥ 0 ,
which contradicts equation 3. □
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Lemma A.6. The intersection of the best response correspondence Bi(β−i) with
Ki is order-convex for every β−i.
Proof. Fix β−i. Since the intersection of Bi(β−i) with Ki is a closed subset of
Ki and Ki is locally complete, it follows that Bi(β−i) ∩ Ki is locally complete.
Further, the best response correspondence Bi is closed with respect to the monotone
contraction h constructed in Lemma A.3. Therefore, Bi(β−i) ∩Ki is order-convex
for every β−i. □
Corollaries A.2 and A.4, together with Lemmas A.5 and A.6 imply that the
assumptions of Theorem 4.1 are satisfied for the all-pay auction when Ki is the set
of strategies of bounded variation defined as by equation 1. Therefore, the all-pay
auction has a Bayesian equilibrium in which bidders play strategies in Ki.
A.2. First-price auction with interdependent values. We first describe the
bidder-specific set of strategies Ki, and show that it is order-convex. We then show
that the best responses satisfy the requirements of Theorem 4.1.
Fix a bidder i. For every subset of indeces L ⊆ {1, . . . ,K}, define the followig
set of types of bidder i:
TLi =
{
t ∈ [t, t]K : ∂vi
∂tik
(t) ≥ 0 if k ∈ L and ∂vi
∂tik
(t) < 0 if k /∈ L
}
.
Notice that each TLi is a (Borel) measurable subset of [t, t]K . Furthermore, they
constitute a partition of bidder i’s type space, since ∪LTLi = [t, t]K and TLi ∩TL
′
i = ∅
whenever L ̸= L′. Thus each ti ∈ [t, t]K is an element of TLi for one and only one
L ⊆ {1, . . . ,K}.
Define Ki to be the set of (equivalence classes of) measurable functions from
[t, t]K to B such that their restriction to each TLi is nondecreasing in tik if k ∈ L
and nondecreasing in tik if k /∈ L. We consider Ki to be a subset of the set of real-
valued, measurable functions over [t, t]K under the L1-norm topology. We next
show that the subset Ki is compact.
Lemma A.7. The set Ki is L1-norm compact.
Proof. If ∂vi∂tik (t) = 0 for every t ∈ [t, t]
K , then the result is straightforward. So we
may assume that is not the case. Let gn ∈ Ki be a sequence of functions in Ki.
By the diagonal argument, there exists a subsequence nk such that limnk gnk(r) =
h(r) exists for every r in a countable dense subset of [t, t]K . Define the function
g : [t, t]K → B by
g(t) = ∧{h(t̃) : t̃k > tk if t ∈ TLi and k ∈ L, and t̃k < tk if t ∈ TLi and k /∈ L} .
By construction, g ∈ Ki. Moreover, limnk gnk(t) = g(t) for continuity points of g.
Theorem 7 of Brunk et al. (1956) and the fact that the set of roots of a nonzero
polynomial function has zero Lebesgue measure imply that the set of of discontinu-
ity points of g has zero Lebesgue measure. And since the distribution of bidder i’s
types is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure, it follows that
gnk converges to g in the L1-norm. □
We now define a hulling for Ki. Partially order Ki by the almost everywhere
pointwise order, whereby
gi ≥ g′i ⇐⇒ gi(ti) ≥ g′i(ti) λ-a.e ,
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where λ denotes the Lebesgue measure. Let Hi denote the collection of all finite
subsemilattices of Ki. The next lemma shows that Hi is a small hulling.
Lemma A.8. The collection Hi of all finite subsemilattices of Ki is a small hulling.
Proof. Clearly, the collection Hi of all finite subsemilattices of Ki is a hulling.
To see that it is a small hulling, suppose that Yn is a sequence of sets in Hi
converging to some gi ∈ Ki. Since, for every n, Yn ⊆ Hi(Yn) ⊆ [∧Yn,∨Yn] ⊆
[∧m≥nYm,∨m≥nYm], it suffices to show that ∥∨m≥nYm−gi∥1 and ∥∧m≥nYm−gi∥1
both go to zero as n goes to infinity. Notice that both ∨m≥nYm and ∧m≥nYm are
monotone sequences of measurable functions that take values in a finite subset of R.
Therefore, both ∨m≥nYm and ∧m≥nYm converge pointwise. Let g∨i and g∧i denote
the respective limits. Suppose ∥g∨i − gi∥1 > 0. There exists a set E with positive
Lebesgue measure λ(E) > 0 such that g∨i (t) ̸= gi(t) for every t ∈ E. However,
since the real numbers are locally complete, it follows that for every t ∈ E and
every selection gni ∈ Yn, the sequence ∨m≥ngni (t) converges to gi(t), which is a
contradiction. A similar argument implies that ∧m≥nYm converges to gi too. □
Finally, we define a monotone realization for Ki.For the purposes of this example,
a monotone realization is a continuous function h : |Γ| → Ki from order simplices
in Γ to Ki.
For every L ⊆ {1, . . . ,K} and c ∈ [0, 1], define the following measurable set of
bidder i’s types:
E(c, L) = {t ∈ [t, t]K : tik ≤ (1− c)t+ ct if k ∈ L, and tik ≥ ct+(1− c)t if k /∈ L} .
Notice that the collection {E(c, L) : c ∈ [0, 1]} is an increasing chain of measurable
subsets of bidder i’s type space that reflects the ordering induced by the partial
derivatives of the valuation function in TLi . Further, the Lebesgue measure of
each set E(c, L) is λ(E(c, L)) = c(t − t), E(0, L) is a singleton for every L, and
E(1, L) = [t, t]K for every L. Therefore, it follows that, for every ti ∈ [t, t]K , there
exists one L ⊆ {1, . . . ,K} such that ti ∈ E(1, L) ∩ TLi = TLi .
If Y ∈ Γ is a simplex in the order complex of Ki, then Y consists of a finite
chain in Ki. Thus the elements in Y can be identified with the ordered vector
Y = (g1, . . . , gn), with g1 ≤ · · · ≤ gn. And a point x in the geometric realization
|Y | can be writen as x = (xg1 , xg2 , . . . , xgn). We can now define the monotone
realization h : |Γ| → Ki by
h(x)(ti) =

g1(ti) if ti ∈ E(xg1 , L) ∩ TLi ,
g2(ti) if ti ∈ [E(xg1 + xg2 , L) \ E(xg1 , L)] ∩ TLi ,
· · ·
gn(ti) if ti ∈ [E(1, L) \ E(
∑n−1
ℓ=1 xgℓ , L)] ∩ TLi .
That the function h is continuous follows from the Pasting Lemma and the fact
that the distribution of bidders’ types is absolutely continuous with respect to
the Lebesgue measure. The next lemma establishes that h is a local monotone
realization.
Lemma A.9. The monotone realization h is local.
Proof. If Yn is a sequence of finite chains in Ki converging to some g ∈ Ki, then
∨Yn and ∧Yn also converge to g, thus ∥ ∨ Yn − ∧Yn∥1 goes to zero. Further, for
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every g′ ∈ [∧Yn,∨Yn], it follows that ∥∨Yn −∧Yn∥1 = ∥∨Yn − g′∥1 + ∥g′ −∧Yn∥1.
The proof is complete by noting that h(|Yn|) ⊆ [∧Yn,∨Yn]. □
All that is left to show is that the best response correspondence satisfies the
conditions required by Theorem 4.1. We denote by Vi(b | ti, β−i) bidder i’s interim
payoff, given by






fj(tj) d t−i .
Lemma A.10. Fix a bid profile β−i ∈ K−i of players other than i. If Bi(β−i) is
bidder i’s best response to β−i, then Bi(β−i) ∩Ki is nonempty and order-convex.
Proof. Fix a profile β−i of bids for players other than i. We first show that the
intersection Bi(β−i) ∩ Ki is not empty. Let Bi denote the interim best response
correspondence, defined by
Bi(β−i | ti) = argmax
b∈B
Vi(b | ti, β−i) ,
and consider the selection gi(ti) = ∨Bi(β−i |). It is well-defined because B is finite.
Moreover, it is measurable because the pointwise partial order is measurable.
Suppose ti, t′i ∈ TLi are such that tik ≥ t′ik for k ∈ L and tik ≤ t′ik for k /∈ L.
It suffices to show that if b ≤ b′ and b ∈ Bi(β−i | ti) and b′ ∈ Bi(β−i | t′i), then
b′ ∈ Bi(β−i | ti).
Vi(b
′ | ti, β−i)− Vi(b | ti, β−i) =∫
[ρi(b








′ − ρi(b, β−i(t−i)b]
∏
j ̸=i
fj(tj) d t−i .
Since vi(ti, t−i) ≥ vi(ti, t−i) for every t−i and ρi(b′, β−i(t−i))− ρi(b, β−i(t−i)) ≥ 0,
it follows that
Vi(b
′ | ti, β−i)− Vi(b | ti, β−i) ≥∫
[ρi(b








′ − ρi(b, β−i(t−i)b]
∏
j ̸=i
fj(tj) d t−i .
Therefore,
Vi(b
′ | ti, β−i)− Vi(b | ti, β−i) ≥ Vi(b′ | t′i, β−i)− Vi(b | t′i, β−i) ≥ 0 .
Because b ∈ Bi(β−i | ti), it follows that b′ ∈ Bi(β−i | ti).
Since the intersection Bi(β−i) ∩Ki is a closed subset of Ki that is closed with
respect to the hulling from Lemma A.8 and with respect to the monotone realization
h from Lemma A.9, it follows that Bi(β−i) ∩Ki is order-convex. □
Therefore, by Theorem 4.1, this auction has an equilibrium in K.
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A.3. First-price auction of multiple objects. Fix a bidder i. To define the
bidder-specific set of strategies Ki, first partition the set of types [0, 1]2 above and
below the diagonal. That is, let [0, 1]2 = T 1i ∪ T 2i , where
T 1i = {t ∈ [0, 1]2 : tA ≥ tB} ,
and
T 2i = {t ∈ [0, 1]2 : tA < tB} .
Define Ki to be the set of measurable functions βi : [0, 1]2 → B that satisfy the
following requirement:
(⋆) For every pair of types ti, t′i ∈ T ki , with k = 1, 2, if tAi ≥ t′iA and tBi ≤ t′iB ,
then βi(ti)A ≥ βi(t′i)A and βi(ti)B ≤ βi(t′i)B .
We consider Ki to be a subset of the set of (equivalence classes of) measurable
functions over [0, 1]2 under the L1-norm topology. We next show that the subset
Ki is compact.
Lemma A.11. The set Ki is is L1-norm compact.
Proof. The set Ki in this subsection is a special case of the set Ki defined in
Subsection A.2, thus the desired result follows from Lemma A.7. □
We now define a hulling for Ki. Consider the partial order ≥i on Ki whereby
g ≥i f whenever for almost every ti ∈ T 1i
gA(ti) ≥ fA(ti) and gB(ti) ≤ fB(ti) ,
and for almost every ti ∈ T 2i
gA(ti) ≤ fA(ti) and gB(ti) ≥ fB(ti) .
Let Hi denote the collection of all finite subsemilattices of Ki according to the
partial order ≥i. The next lemma establishes that Hi is a small hulling.
Lemma A.12. The collection Hi of all finite subsemilattices of Ki under ≥i is a
small hulling.
Proof. The desired result follows from the proof of Lemma A.8. □
Finally, we define a monotone realization for Ki. Recall that a monotone realiza-
tion is a continuous function h : |Γ| → Ki, from order simplices in Γ to Ki. If Y ∈ Γ
is a simplex in the order complex of Ki, then Y consists of a finite chain in Ki.
Thus the elements in Y can be identified with the ordered vector Y = (g1, . . . , gn),
with g1 ≤i · · · ≤i gn. And a point x in the geometric realization |Y | can be writen
as x = (xg1 , xg2 , . . . , xgn). Define the monotone realization h : |Γ| → Ki by
h(x)(ti) =

g1(ti) if |tBi − tAi | ≤ xg1 ,




ℓ<n xgℓ < |tBi − tAi | ≤ 1 .
That the function h is continuous follows from the Pasting Lemma and the
fact that the distribution of bidders types is absolutely continuous with respect
to the Lebesgue measure. The next lemma establishes that h is a local monotone
realization.
Lemma A.13. The monotone realization h is local.
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Proof. If Yn is a sequence of finite chains in Ki converging to some g ∈ Ki, then
∨Yn and ∧Yn also converge to g, thus ∥ ∨ Yn − ∧Yn∥1 goes to zero. Further, for
every g′ ∈ [∧Yn,∨Yn], it follows that ∥∨Yn −∧Yn∥1 = ∥∨Yn − g′∥1 + ∥g′ −∧Yn∥1.
The proof is complete by noting that h(|Yn|) ⊆ [∧Yn,∨Yn]. □
Together, Lemmas A.12 and A.13 imply thatKi is order-convex, which is recorded
in the following corollary.
Corollary A.14. The set Ki is an order-convex subset of strategies of bidder i.
The remaining lemmas establish that the best response correspondence satisfies
the assumptions of Theorem 4.1.
Lemma A.15. Fix a profile β−i of bids of players other than i and a type ti ∈ [0, 1]2
of bidder i. Let Bi(ti, β−i) be bidder i’s interim best response to β−i when his type
is ti. Then the following are true:
(1) If ti ∈ T 1i and b, d ∈ Bi(ti, β−i), then (bA ∨ dA, bB ∧ dB) ∈ Bi(ti, β−i).
(2) If ti ∈ T 2i and b, d ∈ Bi(ti, β−i), then (bA ∧ dA, bB ∨ dB) ∈ Bi(ti, β−i).
Proof. (1) Suppose ti ∈ T 1i and b, d ∈ Bi(ti, β−i). Let π(S, b) denote the prob-












vi(S, ti)π(S, b) ,
then
W (bA ∨ dA, bB ∧ dB) +W (bA ∧ dA, bB ∨ dB)−W (b)−W (d)
= tBi [π(B, b
A ∨ dA, bB ∧ dB) + π(B, bA ∧ dA, bB ∨ dB)− π(B, b)− π(B, d)]
≥ 0 .
Since b, d ∈ Bi(ti, β−i),
W (bA ∨ dA, bB ∧ dB) +W (bA ∧ dA, bB ∨ dB)−W (b)−W (d) ≥ 0
implies that (bA ∨ dA, bB ∧ dB) ∈ Bi(ti, β−i), which completes the proof.
(2) A similar argument, with the roles of A and B reversed, proves (2).
□
Lemma A.16. Fix a profile β−i of bids of players other than i and let Bi(β−i) be
bidder i’s best response to β−i. The intersection Bi(β−i) ∩Ki is non-empty.
Proof. Let Bi denote the interim best response correspondence, defined by
Bi(β−i | ti) = argmax
b∈B
Vi(b | ti, β−i) ,
and consider the selection
gi(ti) =
{
(∨Bi(β−i | ti)|A,∧Bi(β−i | ti)|B) if ti ∈ T 1i
(∧Bi(β−i | ti)|A,∨Bi(β−i | ti)|B) if ti ∈ T 2i
It is well-defined by Lemma A.15 and because B is finite. Moreover, it is measurable
because the pointwise partial order is measurable.
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Suppose ti, t′i ∈ T 1i are such that tAi ≥ t′iA and tBi ≤ t′iB . It suffices to show that
if b ∈ Bi(β−i | ti) and b′ ∈ Bi(β−i | t′i), then (bA ∨ b′A, bB ∧ b′B) ∈ Bi(β−i | t′i).
Vi(b
A ∨ b′A, bB ∧ b′B | t′i, β−i)− Vi(b′ | t′i, β−i)
= t′i
A[π(AB ∪A, bA ∨ b′A, bB ∧ b′B)− π(AB ∪A, b′)] + t′iB [π(B, bA ∨ b′A, bB ∧ b′B)− π(B, b′)]
≥ tAi [π(AB ∪A, bA ∨ b′A, bB ∧ b′B)− π(AB ∪A, b′)] + tBi [π(B, bA ∨ b′A, bB ∧ b′B)− π(B, b′)]
= Vi(b
A ∨ b′A, bB ∧ b′B | ti, β−i)− Vi(b′ | ti, β−i) .
By the same argument as in Lemma A.15, it follows that
Vi(b
A∨b′A, bB∧b′B | ti, β−i)−Vi(b′ | ti, β−i)−Vi(b | ti, β−i)+Vi(bA∧b′A, bB∨b′B | ti, β−i) ≥ 0 .
Because b ∈ Bi(β−i | ti), it follows that
Vi(b
A ∨ b′A, bB ∧ b′B | ti, β−i)− Vi(b′ | ti, β−i) ≥ 0 ,
and thus b′ ∈ Bi(β−i | t′i).
If ti, t′i ∈ T 2i , then a similar argument, with the roles of A and B reversed,
completes the proof. □
Lemma A.17. Fix a profile β−i of bids of players other than i and let Bi(β−i) be
bidder i’s best response to β−i. The intersection Bi(β−i)∩Ki is closed with respect
to the hulling Hi.
Proof. The desired result follows from Lemmas A.15 and A.16. □
Lemma A.18. Fix a profile β−i of bids of players other than i and let Bi(β−i) be
bidder i’s best response to β−i. The intersection Bi(β−i)∩Ki is closed with respect
to the monotone realization h.
Proof. This follows from the construction of the monotone realization. □
Together, Lemmas A.16-A.18 imply the following corollary, which allows us to
apply Theorem 4.1 to show that this auction has a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in
K.
Corollary A.19. Fix a profile β−i ∈ K−i of bids of players other than i and
let Bi(β−i) be bidder i’s best response to β−i. The intersection Bi(β−i) ∩ Ki is
non-empty and order-convex.
Appendix B. Characterizations of ANR’s
This Appendix provides mathematical background, describing topological results
related to the theory of ANR’s. Dugundji (1951) proves a generalization of the
Tietze extension theorem for functions taking values in a locally convex topological
vector space, and the following basic characterization results are straightforward
consequences of this:
Theorem B.1. X is an ANR if and only there is a convex subset Y of a Banach
space and a closed Z ⊆ Y such that X is homeomorphic to Z and Z is a retract of
a neighborhood U ⊆ Y of Z.
Theorem B.2. X is an AR if and only there is a convex subset Y of a Banach
space and a closed Z ⊆ Y such that X is homeomorphic to Z and Z is a retract of
Y .
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An abstract simplicial complex is a pair K = (V,Σ) in which V is a set of vertices
and Σ is a collection of finite nonempty subsets of V that contains every subset of
each of its elements. Elements of Σ are called simplices. A subcomplex of K is a
simplicial complex K′ = (V ′,Σ′) with V ′ ⊆ V and Σ′ ⊆ Σ.
The realization of K is
|K| =
{
x ∈ RV+ :
∑
v∈V
xv = 1, and {v ∈ V : xv > 0} ∈ Σ
}
.
For a simplex σ ∈ Σ let |σ| = {x ∈ |K| : {v ∈ V : xv > 0} ⊆ σ }. Then |K| =∪
σ∈Σ |σ|. We will always assume that for every v ∈ V , {v} ∈ Σ because otherwise
v has no geometric significance. We endow |K| with the CW topology, which is the
topology in which a set is open if its intersection with each |σ| is open when |σ| has
its usual topology.
If U is an open cover of X, a map f : |K| → X is a realization of K relative to U
if, for each σ ∈ Σ, there is some U ∈ U such that f(|σ|) ⊆ U . A partial realization
of K relative to U is a continuous function f ′ : |K′| → X for some subcomplex
K′ = (V,Σ′) with the same vertex set as K such that for each σ ∈ Σ there is some
U ∈ U such that f(|σ| ∩ |K′|) ⊆ U .
Theorem B.3 (Dugundji (1957)). The following are equivalent:
(a) X is an ANR.
(b) Each open cover U of X has a refinement V such that any partial realization
of a simplicial complex relative to V extends to a realization relative to U .
In its details the proof is quite complex, but nonetheless it is useful to sketch some
of the main ideas. Standard embedding results imply that X is homeomorphic to a
subset Z of a Banach space that is a closed subset of its convex hull C. When X is
an ANR there is a neighborhood W ⊆ C and a retraction r : W → Z. Passing from
a given open cover U of Z to a refinement V as per (b) is a relatively straightforward
construction that takes advantage of r and the convex structure of C.
Now suppose that (b) holds. There is an open cover of C \Z consisting of every
open ball centered at a point x ∈ C \ Z of radius one third the distance from x
to Z. (Here “distance” means the infimum of the distances from x to points in
Z.) Since metric spaces are paracompact there is a locally finite refinement of this
cover. The subset W of this cover consisting of those elements that are sufficiently
close (in a suitable sense) to Z is a cover of W \Z for some neighborhood W of Z.
The nerve of W is the simplicial complex K = (W,Σ) in which the elements of Σ
are the sets σ ⊆ W such that
∩
W∈σW ̸= ∅. Let {gW }W∈W be a partition of unity
subordinate to W. Then the gW are the components of a map g : W \ Z → |K|.
Suppose that β : |K| → Z is a map such that for each z ∈ Z and each > 0 there is
some δ > 0 such that β(|σ|) is contained in the ε-ball centered at z whenever σ is
an element of Σ whose members are all contained in the δ-ball centered at z. Then
the function r : W → Z that is the identity on Z and β ◦ g on W \Z is continuous,
hence a contraction.
The main elements of the construction of β are as follows. For each n = 1, 2, . . .
let Wn be the set of W ∈ W whose distance from Z is in the interval [2−n, 2−n+1).
Let Kn = (Wn,Σn) where Σn is the set of σ ∈ Σ with σ ⊆ Wn, and let K′n =
(Wn ∪ Wn+1,Σ′n) where Σ′n is the set of σ ∈ Σ with σ ⊆ Wn ∪ Wn+1. For each
W ∈ W choose a point zW ∈ Z whose distance from W is less than twice the
distance from W to Z. For each n this gives a map from |(Wn, { {W} : W ∈ Wn })|
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to Z, and we wish to extend this to a map on |Kn|. Then we wish to extend the
maps on |Kn| and |Kn+1| to a map on |K′n|. For any W ∈ W, the supremum of
the distances from a point in W to Z in not more than twice the infimum, so if





n, and the maps on the various |K′n| combine to form the desired β.
Using the sorts of covers provided by (b), we can insure the existence of the desired
extensions, and we can arrange for the extension to be governed by very fine open
covers of Z when n is large, thereby obtaining the desired continuity.
Using this result, Dugundji (1965) established another characterization of ANR’s,
and a sufficient condition for a space to be an ANR. We say that X is locally equicon-
nected (some authors say uniformly locally contractible) if there is a neighborhood
W ⊆ X ×X of the diagonal ∆ := { (x, x) : x ∈ X } and a map λ : W × [0, 1] → X
such that:
(a) λ(x, x′, 0) = x′ and λ(x, x′, 1) = x for all (x, x′) ∈W ;
(b) λ(x, x, t) = x for all x ∈ X and t ∈ [0, 1].
We say that λ is an equiconnecting function. An ANR is locally equiconnected
[getreference], and locally equiconnected spaces that are (in a certain sense) finite
dimensional are ANR’s. Whether a locally equiconnected space is necessarily an
ANR was an open question for many years until Cauty (1994) presented a coun-
terexample.
Let U be an open covering ofX, and let Y be a topological space. We say that two
functions f, g : Y → X are U-homotopic if there is a homotopy h : Y × [0, 1] → X
such that h0 = f , h1 = g, and for every x ∈ X there is some U ∈ U such that
h(x, [0, 1]) ⊆ U .
Theorem B.4 (Dugundji (1965)). The following are equivalent:
(a) X is an ANR.
(b) X is locally equiconnected and each open cover U of X has a refinement V
such that every partial realization of the 0-skeleton of a simplicial complex
relative to V extends to a realization relative to U .
(c) For each open cover U of X there is a simplicial complex K, and maps
φ : X → |K| and ψ : |K| → X, such that ψ ◦ φ and the identity function of
X are U-homotopic.
Let W ⊆ X×X be a neighborhood of the diagonal, and let λ :W×[0, 1] → X be
an equiconnecting function. Suppose that U ⊆ X is open, V ⊆ U , and V ×V ⊆W .
Let V 1 = λ(V × V × [0, 1]). If V × V 1 ⊆ W we let V 2 = λ(V × V 1 × [0, 1]),
and we continue this construction as long as V × V n ⊆ W by setting V n+1 =
λ(V ×V n× [0, 1]). If this process does not come to an end and V n ⊆ U for all n we
say that V is λ-stable in U . Reny used the following result to show that the space
of (equivalence classes of) monotone pure strategies is an ANR.
Theorem B.5 (Dugundji (1965)). If X is locally equiconnected and there is an
equiconnecting function λ such that for each x ∈ X and neighborhood U of x there
is a neighborhood V ⊆ U that is λ-stable in U , then X is an ANR.
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